AFTER FEBRUARY 15: SOME CONSIDERATIONS
plays Past elections serious analysis, both numerical and qualitative assessment of what happened. We should start focusing on the nature of political communication that we live in Venezuela. On this occasion, the sector that made use of fear as a strategy was the government. The advertisements that indicated the possibility of loss of social achievements and missions, the Mercal were very effective in achieving the mobilization of key constituencies in the Venezuelan process: social strata D and E.
The opposition could not remove the thesis that would destroy missions and Barrio Adentro modules. The experiences of what has been done so far by the governors of Táchira, Miranda and Carabobo are fresh in the memory of social groups and certainly responded to the message of the citizen president. Moreover, we have the impact of social time, ie the temporary space was opposed to respond to new elections. The huge costs incurred to finance the campaign of mayors and governors, left almost without resources to the opposition to Chavez. Moreover, the opposition failed to answer the call to customize the vow made by Chavez. It is understood that Chavez would vote for Chavez, and even the anti-Chavez vote for the president, or at least taking into consideration their hostility to Chávez. Without doubt, the personalization of the vote was favorable Chavismo.
The arguments raised by the No campaign were to put it decently futile, useless, but the best word they could use is stupid. The phrase is not NO, is of a simplicity that does not say anything and to the discourse of Chavez Chavez's departure would mean the loss of social achievements, the option left to voters of the layers D and E was clear: support for the president's proposal. But that does not mean that the mobilized sectors around Chavez, the administration officials and the structure of the PSUV not review their performance. Undoubtedly, there are still many spots to be cauterized, one of them the subject of bureaucracy, the other insecurity. Persist in the matrix that everything is fine as is, as the election results prove it would certainly be an idiot in the same mood of the theme of the opposition campaign. By the PSUV is an ethical obligation to go to improve the nature of the proceedings and the actual development of the state structure and the party. Can no longer postpone the process of ideological discussion of deliberation on the development of party officials. Yes
stresses the revolutionary road to socialism without violence persecution should then insist on the processes of collective organization and the ideological debate aimed at criticism value and meaning. You can not overlook the fact that while Chavez recovered from the decline in its electoral between 2006 and 2007, when she went from 7,300,000 votes to 4,300,000 just to get 5,600,000 in 2008 and up to 3 months after 6,100,000, but also the opposition to this process succeeded in overcoming the barrier of the 4 million votes. Opposition to Chávez step of 4,200,000 in 2006 to 4,500,000 in 2007, then to 4,600,000 in 2008 and 5 million in 2009. Growth is lower in relation with Chavez, but it is a fact that should be considered. When we analyze the scenario in Zulia, we call attention to the PSUV because even noticeable organizational weaknesses which, however, allows flow increase in the state election, going from 541,000 to 690,000 votes, ie their strength increased by about 150,000 votes. For its part, the opposition to step away from getting 656,000 votes in November 2008 to 769,000 in 2009, that's an increase of 113,000 votes. Zulia remains
The oil stain on the hegemony of Chavez, that forces the PSUV to rethink their local and regional strategies. Maracaibo's case is an example: Chiquinquira popular parishes, Bolivar, St. Lucia are openly opposed to the choice of president, this indicates a better job of organizing and penetration by UNT in connection with work done by the PSUV. In parishes where Chavez dominated as Eugenio Bustamante Francisco, San Isidro, Luís Hurtado advantage is not overwhelming. In sum the Zulia is a perfect case for the implementation of the 3Rs: review, rectify and relaunch. We'll see
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
17/02/2009
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