Woodburry Commons Chanel

Venezuela: an assessment after 10 years of Chavez's victory

VENEZUELA: 10 YEARS AFTER THE TRIUMPH OF CHAVEZ (1998-2008)

glimpses analysis compared the development of general indicators (social, political, economic, etc) between two points or historical circumstances. It is perhaps the most complete tool - epistemologically speaking, to study interpretation and construct a critical vision of history.
In Venezuela, where on Saturday marked 10 years after the victory of Chavez, we are given an extraordinary opportunity for comparative analysis. The 1st point must be the political system. When Chavez came to power, the political system had evolved from a two-party system - with 2 AD dominant organizations and one multi-COPEI. The deterioration of historical forces or parties was evident. AD and had gone to get COPEI 93% of the valid votes in the 1988 elections reach just 43% in 1993 and just 6% in 1998. The emergence of organizations of the new momentum - MVR, Proyecto Venezuela, showed signs that something was changing in the Venezuelan political decisions. The political re-articulation is significant, whether we take into account those who support Chavez and those who oppose it. The re-politicization of the Venezuelan people is clear and thus there is an increase of the idea of \u200b\u200bcitizenship beyond mere electoral exercise. At this point the balance must be positive.
The Venezuelan economy, which for the moment of triumph Chávez was affected by the 1994 banking crisis, hit by structural adjustment agenda implemented by Teodoro Venezuela Pettkoff not envisioned with great expectations. A barrel of oil price below U.S. $ 10 per barrel ensured a critical situation. Chavez's initial measures favored the bank capital. Protection through the monitoring of change, the initial maintenance of economic policy belied Caldera big changes. Would be after the re-legitimization of Chávez in 2000 when he began to economic adjustment through a policy designed to diversify the productive nature of the economy. The confrontation with the national capital would be the dominant feature and explains the fact why the political conflict will be led by Pedro Carmona, president of FEDECAMARAS from the strike of December 10, 2001, organized as a reaction to the enabling legislation. The economic indicators speak for themselves. Economic growth rates back to 2003 indicate some success that has allowed Chavez out a social policy that has yielded the fruits election. The increase in the price of a barrel of oil as a result of a foreign policy that gave priority to industry recovery was remarkable. However, in this case we consider that the balance is not all positive.
From the social point of view, Chavez's government brought the issue to the agenda. And she brought not as a compensatory element, as was the case in the Agenda Venezuela, he brought as a priority line of action. The recovery of the indicators that make up the Human Development Index (HDI) such as education, infant mortality, schooling, health care, among others, is evident. At this point the balance is positive without any debate. The figures speak for themselves. In fact they are so effective that we do see the social actions of Manuel Rosales, one realizes how emulate Chavez's policies. The international theme
the status or balance can be ambiguous. On one side is positive in the sense to advance a policy that emphasized the non-aligned foreign policy of Venezuela with the interests and positions of the U.S.. Forward a policy that served the so-called diplomatic fronts (Caribbean, Andean, Amazonian and Atlantic) was a resounding success and catapulted regional leadership level Chavez. The downside is that somehow his action was seen as a kind of imperialism in Latin America, and although it is not, the U.S. has exploited the presence and support of Chavez to other spaces in the Caribbean and Latin America, using this partnership as political propaganda against. The fact that the Chavez government has not been very effective in explaining the meaning foreign aid, has meant that areas not well informed to believe that it is "giving away" money from the Venezuelans.
With respect to the recognition of human and social rights, it should be firm in indicating that the process of integration of traditionally excluded sectors of the social spheres has been a trademark of Chavez. The incorporation and care of children, women and ethnic minorities has resulted in important social supports should be recognized. These sectors have been particularly favored to become social subjects for priority action by state agencies. The balance, positive.
The issue of social conflict must be addressed. Any process of adjustment and / or political transition, defined as a change in social and political conditions generates resistance. Hegemonic political factors, related to the historical political parties were actually displaced from the exercise of power. Social conflict and intolerance of the period 2001-2004 will not be easily forgotten. The deficit of democratic coexistence of the conflicting parties was demonstrated and should be a collective effort to recover the mutual tolerance and respect, "At this point the balance is negative.
The fact that Chavez has proposed a general plan of the country, as was demonstrated in the Development Plan Social economic nation (PDESN) 2001-2007 and 2007-2013 is an achievement. There is a prospect for the future of the country, although not shared by all, according to a reference path that assumes the need for a prospective medium-term about the direction of social, economic and political where it is headed in Venezuelan society. The balance, positive.
There is no doubt that the situation actively and conflict looms again. The proposed constitutional amendment surprised the forces of opposition to Chavez and the mechanism chosen to present it - the initiative of the National Assembly, giving little time for the opposition to prepare for and activated in an attempt to reduce the advantage of close lead of 1,500,000 votes obtained by the PSUV in the election of 23-N. The challenge of the opposition is not to get swept in this circumstance. For Chavez is raising its vote by resorting to the shape and leadership of Chávez. The 2009 appears to us very busy and interesting. Dr. John E.

Historian
Romero
Juane1208@gmail.com
07/12/2008

Metformin Increased Mucus

De Venancio Pulgar Manuel Rosales, the same lie

De Venancio Pulgar Manuel Rosales, the same lie

El Zulia has become the epicenter of a real electoral battle. For a meticulous observer, it is simply a personal confrontation between Chavez and Rosales, but there are elements that show us who attended a discussion policy, defined as the presentation, discussion and advocacy of a political platform with another antagonistic political reference.
For the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) the race is looking for two key objectives: 1) to rebound from the defeat of the last 2-D, 2007, when the structure of the party failed in its attempt to pass the constitutional amendment and 2) regain lost political space in the region, the product of internal divisions, civil strife and political disorganization. These tasks are not easy to perform. The behavior of the electorate Zulia is elusive as a serious obstacle. Furthermore, the Manichean management Rosales arises from the Zulia, its links with politics and religion, has not been sufficiently removed by the Campaign Command Di Martino, but the constant visits of President Chavez has sought to remedy this deficiency.
to Rosales, the 23-N process is vital for his political survival. It is undoubtedly a manifestation of political ambition. On the one hand, corresponds to a test of the electoral machinery of Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT), while that is a catalyst for the existence of an effect Rosales, able to translate their personal support to other candidates placed under its wing action. Los Rosales challenges are manifold: 1) demonstrate the ability of survive a new confrontation with President Chavez, 2) consolidate the national leadership of UNT and 3) prevent the advance of Primero Justicia (PJ) as another option to the core of the opposition.
All these elements allow us to understand the particular strength of the campaign in Zulia. The debate has been diverted from the discussion of a policy agenda to be typecast in the field of defense or attack Zulia. By focusing the debate on this issue, the command Rosales scored an important advantage, which decreased to the extent that the President introduced the prospect of direct confrontation between him and Rosales. There is no doubt that the strategy of political communication command current Governor obeys the logic of generating organic identity between himself as a "candidate" (political figure) and Zulia as a whole, in such a way that an attack leaves raised him (Rosales) is a direct attack Zulia. At this point we note the historical advice. Rosales's strategy is the same used by Venancio Pulgar in 1859-1863, when it was raised - almost the same terms, the policy dilemma. It will be recalled
Zulia showed elusive to accept submission to central government from the moment of separation from the Department of the Republic of Venezuela-Colombia so-called Gran Colombia, in 1830. From that period and even the prelude to the federal War, resources and access to communication of the Andean states Zulia (Trujillo, Tachira and Merida) were key to the Venezuelan economy. This fact was exploited by Venancio Pulgar leadership to build a sense of identity manipulation of Zulia, voluntarism identity used for personal gain and in those moments where personal ambition collided with the interests of the Venezuelan state of Zulia and summoned in defense, with the excuse that it was the region which was under attack and not his political ambition. Result: all the historic space Maracaibo, including Zulia state borders and certain areas bordering the state of Falcon, were the subject of an intervention of the National Executive restoring order and generating the flight of thumb, leaving the entire state and its citizens subjected to the consequences of political adventurism. Yesterday and today, the situation arises in the same terms. We are astonished to hear
Rosales noted that when attacking him attacking the Zulia. With more than 120 years later, we encounter expressions such as those outlined in a national channel in the sense that he hate Chavez expressed his hatred of Zulia. It is certainly an example of the impact of historical and cultural manipulation exerted on the Zulia. Confrontation is two (2) political projects, not against a region and its citizens, but to stand as an attack on identity seeks to raise cultural solidarity can be expressed in the form of votes for candidates of Rosales. Again, we witness and regional history is manipulated for personal political interests. It is up to Zulia decide whether to allow this manipulation or otherwise remains to be articulated within the national project preserving its historical and geographical determinants. As the 23-N will see the results and know that we fulfill our duty as historians to denounce the cultural Manichaeism. John E.

Historian

Romero Juane1208@gmail.com
17/11/2008