TURN THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE GREAT ANTI-CRISIS OF CHAVEZ
The announcements made by President Hugo Chavez on Sunday March 22, are suitable for comparative analysis of structural adjustment proposed by Carlos Andrés Pérez in 1989. Both Chávez and CAP are undoubtedly charismatic leaders, with enormous popular appeal and were faced with socio-political situation in a context of crisis.
For CAP, 1989, was drawn under the shadow of overwhelming electoral victory that was achieved in December 1988, promising to send back to the Venezuelans to the time of the Venezuela Arabia. Achieved political hegemony it provided an opportunity for the setting-later known as the Washington Consensus-economic and institutional. The Chavez government, for its part must face the huge impact of the worst economic crisis experienced by the world-system, threatening to destroy us through their consequences. On the other hand, is coming off a major electoral victory in both the consultation in November 2008 as the referendum on the amendment in February 2009. Both leaders, as seen at the time had announced measures to adjust their high popularity, high electoral support and a solid political-institutional guarantees.
However, the dynamics of implementation makes the difference between the two. CAP is inclined to the violent fit option, characterized by an aggressive policy change relations and bureaucratic patronage that characterized the Venezuelan political system since its establishment as a representative democracy in 1958. The decision to follow exactly the recommendations would be made to "reduce the size of government, such as removal of subsidies, the release of fiscal and monetary control, openness to transnational capital, privatization of strategic enterprises, increased gasoline, fixed rate liberalization and active, would be the dominant feature of the government of AD leaders. His decision made some sense: apparently had a strong base of popular support derived from their success in presidential elections. His over-reliance on containment capabilities of its leadership, was his mistake. I never take into consideration that the construction of a framer process - understood as a dynamic transmission of values, attitudes and visions of life that motivate social groups to mobilize, to return to an idealized past and the non-fulfillment of that promise could lead to a cycle of protest and civil disobedience of the magnitudes of 27.28 and February 29, 1989. The arrogance of political elites in AD and COPEI who assumed as immutable truth that social groups were subjects submissive cost them their political hegemony. The decision to apply once a set of structural adjustment programs was a mistake that remind Chávez is responsible for day to day.
Meanwhile, in a scenario more difficult than assumed by CAP in 1989, President Chavez has been a huge political smell sample, while noting that it can be dangerous not to advance in the short term some effective actions as respect to reducing public expenditure luxury. Chávez's action, say several things: 1) its ability to surprise the political opponent, 2) the power of political communication and 3) the decision to advance a progressive adjustment.
Regarding the first issue, most political actors opposition had stopped circulating the news that came a setting of great impact, as it had CAP. Actually the size of the recession resulting from the speculative nature of the world system did provide a set of decisions of great magnitude such as increased gasoline, setting financial and exchange restrictions, devaluation in order, from the perspective of those actors an extreme scenario adjustment that would open the way for a new round of protests. However, nobody expected that all decisions were so limited. Again, as it has in other times - including earlier this year when it decided to include all elected offices in the proposal amendment, Chavez left his opponents speechless.
That sense of wonder, is connected to the 2nd question: political communication. Chavez announced that he would divulge Saturday when the measures in this communication and expectations generated a set of rumors that were strongly debated with all progressive measures: no tax adjustment is characterized by a devaluation, there was no increase in gasoline (although not be ruled out) reduced the estimated selling price of oil to $ 60 $ 40 (although he had reset to $ 50). Political communication strategy worked and virtually nullified the resistance and fears that purport to be suggested. We believe that the measures will be accompanied by other incremental adjustments, intended to control the bureaucracy and excessive government spending, but "for now" will not be disclosed. Finally, the 3rd aspect, is associated to political expediency. Chavez knows he can not advance violent settings, which should create the conditions to be accepted for this action and decided to keep social spending even at the cost of enormous financial and economic risk by publicly states across reduced production oil to just over 3,100,000 barrels a day, trying to be implicated in a price recovery oil. Finally, unlike CAP, Chavez understood that adjustments without political support violent generate cycles of violence that undermine the governance and political hegemony. Based on these aspects, made a political calculation that, although risky and inadequate given enough oxygen to try to survive the storm. We still have a lot to see and we will be attentive to their decisions.
Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
25/03/2009
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