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Facebook to live. We are encouraged that with the pen wand enjoy the tropical sunshine, the graceful movements of the Golden Margarita, the vigorous efforts of the fishermen in their tasks and the wavy hair of the coconut trees caressed by the sweet air of our island. In truth, we are all magicians and the magic becomes reality when we get caught up in the incredible pleasure of drawing

Juan Vicente Silva 07

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RESULTS IN THE ZULIA: spots in politics

PSUV elections that defined the constitutional amendment must be analyzed in their individual results in Zulia state. To do this we must make clear some points: 1) analyzing the results from the referendum of 2007 to 2009, 2) the electoral processes are dissimilar and 3) should be established for the type of choice and the nature of competition a special comparison between the referendum of 2007.
In analyzing the results from 2007 through 2009, what stands out is as Block A, the No and Yes 624,790 won 472,462, a difference of 13% together. Block B, 626,850 and got no Yes, 467,958. In this case the difference was 15%. This undoubtedly shows that the 1st Block of articles proposed by President Chavez was less than the 2nd block rejection proposed by the deputies in the National Assembly. In the elections of 2008, made on November 23 the candidate of Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) Pablo Pérez de776.372 A total votes and the candidate of the PSUV, Gian Carlo Di Martino reached 658,724, a difference between 8 %. In the referendum of 15 February, received 690,753 votes Yes and NO, triumphed again with 769,742, the difference was between 5.41%. That means several things. The 1st is that Chavez had a recovery in the state between 2007-2009 from slightly over 470,000 votes in almost 700,000, however there is a sign that points to a profound contradiction arising from the fact that despite being an oil state, where there are sectors linked to trade unions mobilized around the president's proposal, is still missing. That indicates that there is an ambiguity in the policy approach to the labor sector and the effectiveness of social policy PDVSA PEQUIVEN and others should be reviewed thoroughly.
When we see the behavior in the so-called electoral corridor, comprising the municipalities with the highest voting population among whom it should be noted - in order from highest to lowest population-to Maracaibo, San Francisco, Cabimas, Lagunillas, Mara, Machiques, Columbus Paez, Jesus Enrique Lossada, Miranda and Rosario de Perija. Those municipalities meet approximately 73% of the actual vote in the region. Looking
some cases the outcome of the vote in individual municipalities is very visible the impact of assumptions about the inefficiency and disorganization of the forces of PSUV Zulia. We say this while recognizing the organizational effort that was experienced in the last elections, but remains inadequate in relation to the capacity of mobilization and organization of UNT.
The Municipality of Maracaibo, in 2007 the average did not get one (Option A + Option B) of 285,000 votes while the Yes hit 169,000. A percentage difference of 25%. In November 2008, the nomination of Paul Perez managed in the municipality votes to 219 256 333 955 Di Martino. At the parish level lost in Bolivar, Cacique Mara, Carraciolo Parra, Cecilio Acosta, Chiquinquirá Coquivacoa, Christ Aranza, Juana de Avila, Manuel Dagnino, Olegario Villalobos, Raul Leoni and Santa Lucia. The PSUV won only Antonio Borjas, Francisco Eugenio Bustamante, Ildefonso Vasquez, Luis Hurtado and Venancio Pulgar. The paradox is that the PSUV profit percentage differences were very low (between 0.5% and 5%) while UNT ranged between 5% and 35%. It is illogical, for parishes and Bolivar, Raul Leoni, Chiquinquirá, Cacique Mara, Cecilio Acosta, Aranza Christ, are composed mostly located in areas D and E strata, where Chavez has traditionally had excellent results. How do you explain this? Without doubt, the result is the consequence of the kind of leadership and organizational capacity deployed in the area. There is no doubt that UNT has managed to win those areas, with a more effective welfare policy that was developed through national agencies. That should be a thorough review, which has not happened so far.
In 2008, the Maracaibo Municipality continued to express such behavior. The proportion remained the same of parishes in which the opposition triumphed in which Chavez won. There were other, some recovery in the number of votes, but remains positive about the strength of UNT. This is deeply contradictory, even more it is considered that the gubernatorial candidate for the PSUV came to meet two terms (8 years) as mayor in the municipality. In 2009, the difference marks the Maracaibo Municipality, for all parishes contributed 355,848 of the 769,000 total that won the NO in Zulia state. Numerically speaking to the state capital city, where they seat agencies and representatives of the National Executive which therefore should be more action Plan Simón Bolívar, generated almost 50% of the votes of resistance to the amendment. Certainly something is wrong in Guatemala. If the PSUV does not advance a policy of ideological formation and revision of your machine, run the risk that the Zulia key to become major political loss. Dr. John E.

Historian
Romero
Juane1208@gmail.com
25/02/2009

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RESULTS IN THE ZULIA: spots on policy

PSUV elections that defined the constitutional amendment must be analyzed in their individual results Zulia. To do this we must make clear some points: 1) analyzing the results from the referendum of 2007 to 2009, 2) the electoral processes are dissimilar and 3) should be established for the type of choice and the nature of competition a special comparison between the referendum of 2007.
In analyzing the results from 2007 to 2009, what stands out is as Block A, the No and Yes 624,790 won 472,462, a difference of 13% together. Block B, 626,850 and got no Yes, 467,958. In this case the difference was 15%. This undoubtedly shows that the 1st Block of articles proposed by President Chavez was less than the 2nd block rejection proposed by the deputies in the National Assembly. In the elections of 2008, made on November 23 the candidate of Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT) Pablo Pérez de776.372 A total votes and the candidate of the PSUV, Gian Carlo Di Martino reached 658,724, a difference between 8 %. In the February 15 referendum, the Yes won 690,753 votes and NO, triumphed again with 769,742, the difference was between 5.41%. That means several things. The 1st is that Chavez had a recovery in the state between 2007-2009 from slightly over 470,000 to almost 700,000 votes, yet there is an indication that signals a profound contradiction stems from the fact that despite being an oil state, related sectors where unions mobilized around the president's proposal, is still missing. That indicates that there is an ambiguity in the policy approach to the labor sector and the effectiveness of social policy PDVSA PEQUIVEN and others should be reviewed thoroughly.
When we see the behavior in the corridor called election comprised of the municipalities with the highest voting population among whom it should be noted - in order from highest to lowest population-to Maracaibo, San Francisco, Cabimas, Lagunillas, Mara, Machiques, Columbus, Paez, Jesus Enrique Lossada, Miranda and Rosario Perijá. Those municipalities meet approximately 73% of the actual vote in the region. Looking
some cases the outcome of the vote in individual municipalities is very visible the impact of assumptions about the inefficiency and disorganization of the forces of PSUV Zulia. We say this while recognizing the organizational effort that was experienced in the last election, but still inadequate in relation to the capacity of mobilization and organization of UNT.
The Municipality of Maracaibo, in 2007 the average did not get one (Option A + Option B) of 285,000 votes while the Yes hit 169,000. A percentage difference of 25%. In November 2008, the nomination of Paul Perez managed in the municipality votes to 219 256 333 955 Di Martino. At the parish level lost in Bolivar, Cacique Mara, Carraciolo Parra, Cecilio Acosta, Chiquinquirá Coquivacoa, Christ Aranza, Juana de Avila, Manuel Dagnino, Olegario Villalobos, Raul Leoni and Santa Lucia. The PSUV won only Antonio Borjas, Francisco Eugenio Bustamante, Ildefonso Vasquez, Luis Hurtado and Venancio Pulgar. The paradox is that the PSUV profit percentage differences were very low (between 0.5% and 5%) while UNT ranged between 5% and 35%. It is illogical, as parishes and Bolivar, Raul Leoni, Chiquinquirá, Cacique Mara, Cecilio Acosta, Aranza Christ, are composed mostly located in areas D and E strata, where Chavez has traditionally had excellent results. How do you explain this? Without doubt, the result is the consequence of the kind of leadership and organizational capacity deployed in the area. There is no doubt that UNT has managed to win those areas, with a more effective welfare policy that developed through national agencies. That should be a thorough review, which has not happened so far.
In 2008, the Maracaibo Municipality continued to express such behavior. The proportion remained the same parish in which the opposition triumphed in which Chavez won. There were other, some recovery in the number of votes, but remains positive about the strength of UNT. This is deeply contradictory, even more it is considered that the gubernatorial candidate for the PSUV came to meet two terms (8 years) as mayor in the municipality. In 2009, the difference marks the Maracaibo Municipality, for all parishes contributed 355,848 of the total of 769,000 that received the NO in Zulia state. Numerically speaking to the state capital city, where they seat agencies and representatives of the National Executive which therefore should be more action Plan Simón Bolívar, generated almost 50% of the votes of resistance to the amendment. Certainly something is wrong in Guatemala. If the PSUV does not advance a policy of ideological formation and revision of your machine, run the risk that the Zulia key to become major political loss. Dr. John E.

Historian
Romero
Juane1208@gmail.com
25/02/2009

Clear Blisters In Mouth Means

Amendment, Political Communication and Elections

AMENDMENTS, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION

electoral process Venezuelans live Sunday February 15, have a set of meanings that explain itself the nature of political communication handled by options Yes and No.
In 1st place, the amendment itself involves a debate about two different ways of seeing the constitutional right. Of those who based elitist perspective consider that participation in the political debate be restricted to the mere election of officers and for whom the constitutional bodies should not be reformed, since the reform of the rule leads to lawlessness and conditions instability. Moreover, in the opposite are those within the New Latin American Constitutionalism (NCL) argue that popular sovereignty is a condition of building citizenship and therefore should be extended to the maximum, while think that the Constitutions are imperfect structure and incomplete, subject to change. From one to another position, the distance is abysmal, both in their ideological underpinnings and political practice.
In 2nd place, the amendment reflects a discussion about the true meaning of popular sovereignty, understood as a space for expression of political will and its relationship to the theory of good government, which paradoxically is part of a theory arising from liberal thinking, particularly linked to the idea of \u200b\u200brepresentative government and effective management of the mandate.
In 3rd place, which was discussed in Venezuela on Sunday, is being proposed in Latin America and shows the impact of institutional change on the continent. This is a legal and political debate about the relevance of constitutional legal norms adjust to the accelerated process of change that is experienced in our societies. In the background is the question of how the right can think and incorporate the process of change in the rule of law.
In 4th place, obviously in these parameters previously established in the amendment results in a revision of the conditions of domination and subordination that characterize all the capitalist system, and certainly the Venezuelan system typically maintains even exploitative and thus the amendment becomes a risk to existing relations between capital and labor.
In 5th place, the amendment to support and promote the theory of good government, puts many sectors of the opposition to decide on whether to compete with a charismatic leadership and certainly has a high social impact, through a policy of revival of the rule of law. This is a huge disadvantage, even more so when one considers that the options Chavez lack a political program as an alternative to Simon Bolivar Project presents a vision of the country for the period 2001-2013.
These 5 elements combine through the field of political communication understood as the close relationship between governor and governed as expressed through the intermediation of the mass media. Political communication in the election campaign has clearly identified two vectors: 1) the vector of the expansion of democracy and the exercise of good governance and 2) the vector of the illegitimacy of the amendment. On 1 of them has resulted in a propaganda insists that the benefits of management during 10 years of the Chavez government and the possibilities of broadening and deepening the Bolivarian project through the elimination of restrictions on the times you can run an official exercise. The 2nd says that the illegitimacy of the amendment is part of a series of irregularities conducted by the Chavez government. Accompanying addition to the management of fear as a factor of restraint in political volunteerism triggered by public policies carried out by using the huge oil resources.
Political propaganda has stressed these two vectors ideas: good governance and illegitimacy-hazard of the amendment. The ads have moved through the use of images and audiovisual resources that seek to reinforce that perspective or representation frameworks of interpretation. This is one side of raising a cultural continuity with the development of a policy of strengthening citizenship, but on the other side is to propose a cultural clash with the "apparent" identity "politics of Venezuela. These strategies have the same goal: to achieve greater mobilization of voters. Pugan The two sectors are aware of the proportionality of their forces and seek to mobilize achieved supremacy over the other. Anyone who wins, it will be on stage with one abstention to be around 35% to 40%, hopefully on Sunday to see the results. Dr. John E.

Historian
Romero
Juane1208@gmail.com
10/02/2009

How To Tell If A Scorpio Is Interested

AFTER FEBRUARY 15: SOME OF FEBRUARY FEBRUARY

AFTER FEBRUARY 15: SOME CONSIDERATIONS

plays Past elections serious analysis, both numerical and qualitative assessment of what happened. We should start focusing on the nature of political communication that we live in Venezuela. On this occasion, the sector that made use of fear as a strategy was the government. The advertisements that indicated the possibility of loss of social achievements and missions, the Mercal were very effective in achieving the mobilization of key constituencies in the Venezuelan process: social strata D and E.
The opposition could not remove the thesis that would destroy missions and Barrio Adentro modules. The experiences of what has been done so far by the governors of Táchira, Miranda and Carabobo are fresh in the memory of social groups and certainly responded to the message of the citizen president. Moreover, we have the impact of social time, ie the temporary space was opposed to respond to new elections. The huge costs incurred to finance the campaign of mayors and governors, left almost without resources to the opposition to Chavez. Moreover, the opposition failed to answer the call to customize the vow made by Chavez. It is understood that Chavez would vote for Chavez, and even the anti-Chavez vote for the president, or at least taking into consideration their hostility to Chávez. Without doubt, the personalization of the vote was favorable Chavismo.
The arguments raised by the No campaign were to put it decently futile, useless, but the best word they could use is stupid. The phrase is not NO, is of a simplicity that does not say anything and to the discourse of Chavez Chavez's departure would mean the loss of social achievements, the option left to voters of the layers D and E was clear: support for the president's proposal. But that does not mean that the mobilized sectors around Chavez, the administration officials and the structure of the PSUV not review their performance. Undoubtedly, there are still many spots to be cauterized, one of them the subject of bureaucracy, the other insecurity. Persist in the matrix that everything is fine as is, as the election results prove it would certainly be an idiot in the same mood of the theme of the opposition campaign. By the PSUV is an ethical obligation to go to improve the nature of the proceedings and the actual development of the state structure and the party. Can no longer postpone the process of ideological discussion of deliberation on the development of party officials. Yes
stresses the revolutionary road to socialism without violence persecution should then insist on the processes of collective organization and the ideological debate aimed at criticism value and meaning. You can not overlook the fact that while Chavez recovered from the decline in its electoral between 2006 and 2007, when she went from 7,300,000 votes to 4,300,000 just to get 5,600,000 in 2008 and up to 3 months after 6,100,000, but also the opposition to this process succeeded in overcoming the barrier of the 4 million votes. Opposition to Chávez step of 4,200,000 in 2006 to 4,500,000 in 2007, then to 4,600,000 in 2008 and 5 million in 2009. Growth is lower in relation with Chavez, but it is a fact that should be considered. When we analyze the scenario in Zulia, we call attention to the PSUV because even noticeable organizational weaknesses which, however, allows flow increase in the state election, going from 541,000 to 690,000 votes, ie their strength increased by about 150,000 votes. For its part, the opposition to step away from getting 656,000 votes in November 2008 to 769,000 in 2009, that's an increase of 113,000 votes. Zulia remains
The oil stain on the hegemony of Chavez, that forces the PSUV to rethink their local and regional strategies. Maracaibo's case is an example: Chiquinquira popular parishes, Bolivar, St. Lucia are openly opposed to the choice of president, this indicates a better job of organizing and penetration by UNT in connection with work done by the PSUV. In parishes where Chavez dominated as Eugenio Bustamante Francisco, San Isidro, Luís Hurtado advantage is not overwhelming. In sum the Zulia is a perfect case for the implementation of the 3Rs: review, rectify and relaunch. We'll see

Dr. Juan Eduardo Romero
Historian
Juane1208@gmail.com
17/02/2009